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In his 2010 paper “Philosophical Naturalism and Intuitional Method-
ology”, Alvin Goldman invokes the Condorcet Jury Theorem in order to
defend the reliability of intuitions. The present note argues that the origi-
nal conditions of the theorem are all unrealistic when analysed in connection
to the case of intuitions. Alternative conditions are discussed.
1 Introduction
In recent years, special attention has been devoted to the role of intuitions in
philosophy. In his 2010 paper “Philosophical Naturalism and Intuitional Method-
ology”, Alvin I. Goldman argues for the evidential role of intuitions. His proposal
can be outlined as follows. Consider Gettier cases: their upshot is one of the cor-
nerstones of contemporary epistemology, and their philosophical impact is so much
revolutionary that we often refer to post-Gettier epistemology. There is widespread
consensus on the fact that Gettier cases show that a subject can have a justified
true belief in a proposition without having knowledge. Goldman maintains that
this convergence of opinion could play a crucial role in defending the view that the
intuition elicited by Gettier cases is a reliable indicator of the truth of the intu-
ition’s content, that is, the proposition that when a subject is Gettier-related to a
proposition she has a true justified belief in it without having knowledge. More to
the point, the large convergence of opinion is an epistemically relevant fact which
enhances the evidential force of the Gettier intuition, and the possession of this
socially-based evidence may be arguably taken to provide us with a (defeasible)
justification for the truth of the content of the Gettier intuition. This train of
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thought might be taken to provide a socio-epistemological argument for the relia-
bility of the Gettier intuition (the socio-epistemological argument for short).
According to Goldman, these considerations can be formally substantiated by the
Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT henceforth).1 Let us state the theorem in its clas-
sical version.2 Let us define the decision problem as the task of choosing a correct
alternative x given a certain state of the world X, where the state of the world X
is a random variable that can take only two values, 0 and 1 (one of the alterna-
tives is factually correct and the other one incorrect). Consider the following two
conditions:
1. Homogeneous Competence: for each state x ∈ {0, 1}, each individual’s choice




pxi := Pr(Ci = x | X = x) > 12 , and is the same across i.
2. Independence: individuals’ choices are independent of one another condi-
tional on X.
When these conditions hold, we can prove both the asymptotic and the non-
asymptotic conclusions of the theorem. The asymptotic conclusion says that, for
each option, the probability that a majority will choose it, given that the option
is correct, converges to 1 as the number of the individuals increases. The non-
asymptotic conclusion says that a group is more likely to choose the right option
than a single individual (or a smaller group).
Goldman’s discussion of the homogeneous competence and the independence con-
ditions is not extensive. And yet, closer inspection reveals that their satisfaction
cannot be taken for granted in the context of the Gettier intuition. For one thing,
it seems very unlikely to be the case that each individual’s intuitive judgement has
the same probability of being right. For another, it is far from obvious who can be
credited with the required degree of competence about Gettier cases. Moreover,
more needs to be said on what it means for individuals’ intuitive judgements to be
independent in the relevant sense.3 Thus, while I deem Goldman’s idea of drawing
upon the CJT to defend the evidential role of the Gettier intuition worth pursuing,
I also believe that without a careful analysis of the conditions under which the the-
orem holds, the appeal to the CJT does not bring us very far. In other words: the
unrealistic content of the two conditions, along with the high level of idealisation
required to satisfy them jointly, may lead one to suspect that the suggestion of
using CJT to formally substantiate the socio-epistemological argument proves a
dead end.
1Goldman (2010).
2See List and Goodin (2001) for another introduction. to the CJT.
3Goldman notices that the independence condition is not trivially satisfied, but he does not
examine this issue in detail.
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The aim of the present paper is to explore to what extent, if any, we can make
room for more realistic conditions in connection to the case of intuitions while, at
the same time, preserving the role that the CJT plays within Goldman’s socio-
epistemological argument.
Let us begin with the homogeneous competence condition.
2 Homogeneous Competence
The homogeneous competence condition says that each individual’s choice Ci is
correct with the same probability greater than 1
2
. However, it is a widely shared
opinion that the assumption that a group’s members are homogeneous in com-
petence is unrealistic even when we look at standard applications of the CJT.
Clearly, the same holds for the application of the CJT I am exploring here, for it
seems implausible that individuals really exhibit the same degree of competence,
expressed by a probabilistic value, about the epistemic status of gettiered subjects.
This problem might be solved by adopting a different version of the CJT that al-
lows for heterogeneity. In their seminal 1983 paper, Grofman, Owen and Feld show
that the CJT is applicable to any competence distribution no matter how skewed
by taking into account the group’s average competence only.4 This amounts to
making room for a heterogeneous competence condition. Dietrich (2008) aptly
formulates such a condition as follows. Let p¯x indicate the group’s average com-
petence:
p¯x := limn→∞(px1 + ...+ p
x
n)/n (exists
5 and) > 1
2
.
This competence condition captures the intuitive contention that members of
large groups display different degrees of competence regarding the targeted issue,
and it does not alter the asymptotic part of the theorem.
As for the non-asymptotic part, it is commonly held that it does not generally hold
when we make room for heterogeneity across individuals. However, under certain
assumptions, even the non-asymptotic part of the theorem can be restored. For
instance, Ben-Yashar and Paroush (2000) show that if we assume both that the in-
dependence condition is met and that each group member’s competence exceeds 1
2
,
but we do not know what the specific distribution of competence within the group
is, the probability that the group’s choice is correct is greater than the probability
of a correct choice made by a member of the group chosen at random.6
4See Grofman, Owen and Feld (1983).
5That is, the group’s average competence (px1 + ...+ p
x
n) converges as n→∞.
6A corollary of the theorem is that even the probability that the choice of three group’s
members (chosen at random) is correct is greater than the probability of correct choice made by
a single member (always sampled at random).
3
This brief overview shows that it is possible to make room for a more realistic
understanding of how competence is distributed across members of the group: in
order to prove the asymptotic conclusion and, under certain conditions, the non-
asymptotic conclusion of the CJT, members need not be equally competent.
However plausible the homogeneous competence condition may be, though, it must
be stressed that when we focus on intuitions about philosophicalia such as the con-
cept of knowledge, the satisfaction of the competence condition cannot be taken
for granted, for it is far from clear who can be credited with such an initial com-
petence about Gettier cases in the first place. This worry leads us to discuss the
problem of whose intuitions deserve to be taken into account.
A closer look at the literature on philosophical expertise and intuitions reveals
that two cases need to be canvassed: on the one hand, the competence condition
is satisfied by laymen only; on the other hand, only a group formed by experts, i.e.
professional philosophers, can be credited with the required degree of competence.
2.1 Only laymen satisfy the condition
In his paper “Philosophical Theory and Intuitional Evidence” (with Joel Pust,
1998), Goldman argues that we have to take into account the intuitions of non-
philosophers only. A brief explication of Goldman and Pust’s argument to this
effect goes as follows:
(1) Epistemology seeks to shed light on the ordinary concept of knowledge we
use in everyday life.
(2) Laymen do not have specific background assumptions and theoretical pref-
erences to satisfy.
(3) By contrast, philosophers have certain theories to defend and intuitions are
distorted accordingly.
(4) Therefore: laymen’s intuitions are more valuable, in that they are not theo-
retically biased.
It must be noticed that the idea that laymen’s intuitions are more epistemically
valuable than philosophers’ plays a pivotal role in experimentally oriented philo-
sophical analyses of Gettier cases. To illustrate this point, let us briefly review
Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich’s nowadays famous experi-
ment on Gettier cases.7 The experiment asks subjects belonging to two culturally
different groups to establish whether the character in the Gettier case really knows
7See Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2001).
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or only believes the targeted proposition. In a population of Rutgers undergrad-
uates, 74% of participants who self-identified as being “Western” said that the
character “only believes”, while only 43% of East Asian participants and 39% of
Indian Subcontinental participants opted for the same verdict. It must be kept
in mind that experimental subjects do not have a training in philosophy; so, by
looking at the experiment from the perspective of this paper, we could say that
relevant groups satisfying the heterogeneous competence condition are formed by
laymen.
There is an intense debate about Weinberg, Nichols and Stich’s experiment, but
it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse it in depth. Nevertheless, there
are two aspects of the experiment that are relevant to the socio-epistemological
argument which need to be mentioned.8 First, one may wonder whether one of
these ethnic groups is more competent than the others. Secondly, one may wonder
whether one of these ethnic groups faces a difficult decision environment including,
for example, biased evidence. For the time being, I wish to flag these two points
and move on: I will get back to them after discussing what competence and inde-
pendence conditions are more appropriate for the CJT-based socio-epistemological
argument.
The idea that the initial competence condition is satisfied by a group formed by
laymen only does not by itself jeopardise the CJT-based socio-epistemological ar-
gument for the reliability of the Gettier intuition; nevertheless, it leads us to reflect
carefully on what conclusion is allegedly established by the argument. Suppose
that the appeal to the CJT really carries the day and offers probabilistic support to
the socio-epistemological argument: it turns out that the theorem shows that the
Gettier intuition is reliable for individuals belonging to Western Culture, whereas
it shows that for East Asian or Indian Subcontinental individuals it is not. Thus,
if the competence condition is satisfied by groups formed by laymen, and if we take
the experiment’s results at face value, the CJT cannot be used in the context of an
argument which aims to give a justification for the claim that gettiered subjects
do not have knowledge tout court.
As I understand his position, Goldman would defend the view that there is no
tension between the socio-epistemological argument and the findings of Weinberg,
Nichols and Stich’s experiment, for the experiment shows that, as a matter of fact,
Western people and East Asian people have two different concepts of knowledge.9
The socio-epistemological argument relying on the CJT will thereby provide us
with a justification for the truth of the content of the Gettier intuition as far as
the “Western concept” of knowledge is concerned.
8Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on these points.
9See Goldman (2007).
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2.2 Only philosophers satisfy the condition
The approach to the competence condition discussed in the previous section is
controversial. In an exchange with Goldman, Hilary Kornblith takes issue with
the claim that the concept of knowledge varies across cultures. He maintains that
if we admitted the possibility of there being two (or more) concepts of knowl-
edge, we should abandon the idea of philosophy as being an ambitious discipline
which addresses the question of what knowledge is.10 Moreover, Kornblith criti-
cises Goldman’s take on the epistemic value of philosophers’ intuitions by attack-
ing the first step of the argument highlighted in the previous section. Kornblith
acknowledges that theoretically loaded intuitions are inadequate if the goal of
philosophy is to understand our pre-theoretical concept of knowledge. However,
Kornblith maintains that philosophical analysis should not be conceived of as an
attempt at understanding our concepts of justification, truth, knowledge, and so
on. Instead, the target of our epistemological inquiries is some extra-mental phe-
nomenon,11 such the phenomenon of knowledge.12 When we understand the goal
of philosophical inquiry along these lines, it is possible to contend that so long
as theoretical considerations are accurate, theoretically oriented intuitions are not
ipso facto bad intuitions. As Kornblith puts it: “intuitions uninformed by any
theory - or only minimally informed by theories common to the folk - would be no
more useful here than observations performed by investigators wholly ignorant of
relevant background theory in science”.13
In light of the Goldman-Kornblith dispute, it may be worth evaluating the prospects
for a socio-epistemological argument in favor of the reliability of the Gettier intu-
ition which abstracts away from some of the main tenets of Goldman’s methodolog-
ical approach, i.e. the claims that laymen’s intuitions are better than philosophers’,
and that the concept of knowledge varies across cultures.
On reflection, even if Kornblith’s observations about philosophers’ intuitional ex-
pertise are less than conclusive, they seem to offer a way out to those theorists
who acknowledge the potential of the socio-epistemological argument while, at the
same time, disagreeing with both the idea that philosophy investigates the folk’s
concept of knowledge and the contention that Weinberg, Nichols and Stich’s ex-
periment shows the existence of a plurality of concepts of knowledge. In fact, by
10See Kornblith (2007).
11Kornblith (2007: 35)
12Of course, it is far from obvious that there is such an extra-mental and culturally invariant
phenomenon. A discussion of this issue will lead us astray.
13Kornblith (2007: 34). To forestall misunderstandings, though, it must be said that Kornblith
disagrees with the idea that intuitions can play an evidential role for reasons which cannot
be fully analysed here. So, in the quoted passage Kornblith is merely objecting to the idea
that theoretically contaminated intuitions are epistemically bad intuitions without ipso facto
defending the evidential status of intuitions.
6
relying on those remarks, we might contend that the homogeneous competence
condition is satisfied by a group formed by professional philosophers only.
To unpack this a little, we can make sense of the competence condition in two
ways:14
(I) Only laymen satisfy the competence condition.
(II) Only professional philosophers, qua experts, satisfy the condition.
Given Goldman’s overall approach to intuitional methodology, we can safely
maintain that he would endorse (I). In turn, this option may give rise to two
different views:
(Ia) We could maintain - along with experimental philosophers - that the Gettier
intuition is not reliable since there is a clash between two majority views, for
Westerners say that gettiered subjects only believe the targeted propositions
and Easterners say that gettiered subjects know the targeted propositions.
For this reason, the CJT cannot deliver the verdict that the Gettier intuition
is reliable.
(Ib) We could rescue the reliability of the Gettier intuition by saying that it does
not track the universal, Platonic form-like concept of knowledge. Rather,
epistemology deals with the folk’s concept of knowledge. Weinberg, Nichols
and Stich’s experiment merely indicates that Western and Eastern people
should be regarded as different groups having different concepts of knowl-
edge. As far as the Western concept of knowledge is concerned, the Gettier
intuition can be shown to be reliable via the CJT-based socio-epistemological
argument, since the majority view is that gettiered subjects only believe
the targeted propositions. This means that we should accept the idea that
the subject matter of analytic epistemology is the Western folk’s concept of
knowledge rather than the phenomenon of knowledge itself.
Let us turn now to (II). The thesis that only experts, i.e. professional epistemol-
ogists, satisfy the competence condition allows one to restore the idea that philo-
sophical inquiry targets the extra-mental and culturally invariant phenomenon of
14An anonymous referee suggests to investigate the case in which the competence condition is
satisfied both by laymen and philosophers, except that they may differ in competence. As far
as I can see, the suggestion relies on a third approach to philosophical expertise and intuitions
- halfway between Goldman’s and Kornblith’s - which has not yet been defended in the current
literature. I agree with the referee that this would be a worthwhile option to explore, but
responsibility dictates to devote considerable space to a detailed discussion of this alternative take
on philosophical expertise; for this reason, I prefer to stick to the Goldman-Kornblith dispute
and I postpone the analysis of this third option (and of its consequences for the competence
condition) to another separate investigation.
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knowledge rather than different and culturally-based concepts of knowledge. On
this view, there is no need to accept a plurality of concepts of knowledge to make
sense of the result of Weinberg, Nichols and Stich’s experiment, for one might
contend that the experiment is irrelevant since the chosen experimental groups do
not display a sufficient degree of competence. Since only professional philosophers
have competent intuitions about Gettier cases, and since there is a great conver-
gence of opinion among professional epistemologists about the reliability of the
Gettier intuition, we can deploy the socio-epistemological argument to justify the
evidential role of the Gettier intuition.
A proper assessment of the Goldman-Kornblith dispute will lead us astray. Be
that as it may, I believe that the point I have been developing in the previous
paragraphs, namely that the competence condition can be taken to be satisfied in
two rather different ways, strengthens the plausibility of the socio-epistemological
argument: one need not to subscribe to Goldman’s specific standpoint about both
philosophical expertise and the target of philosophical inquiry in order to make
use of the socio-epistemological argument, for the argument can be run even if we
adopt an overall different methodological picture.
Let us take stock. I argued that it is possible to generalise the socio-epistemological
argument to other approaches to philosophical methodology than Goldman’s own.
Depending on the account of the methods and targets of philosophical inquiry one
subscribes to, however, the argument establishes different conclusions. According
to (Ib), the argument succeeds in providing a justification for the thesis that the
Gettier intuition is reliable with respect to the Western concept of knowledge; ac-
cording to (II), the argument offers a justification for the thesis that the Gettier
intuition reliably establishes the truth of the proposition that when a subject is
Gettier-related to a proposition she has a true justified belief in it without having
knowledge, where “knowledge” is to be understood as referring to an extra-mental
phenomenon.
3 Independence
Let us turn now to the independence condition. To begin with, let us say that
the notion of independence used in the standard formulation of the CJT is that
choices are independent conditional on the state of the world X: we cannot learn
anything new about the state if we have already conditionalised on it.15 This
state-conditional notion of independence is needed to state the asymptotic part
of the theorem. However, many authors in the contemporary literature on the
CJT have observed that this conception of independence is unrealistic, in that it
does not take into account possible ways in which individuals’ choices cannot be
15See Grofman, Owen and Feld (1983).
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independent. Let us consider some examples.
Boland (1989), and Boland, Proschan and Tong (1989) notice that individuals can
influence each other, thereby making their choices causally (and probabilistically)
interdependent. However, as pointed out by Ladha (1992), causal and probabilis-
tic independence can fall apart, since individuals can be interdependent because
there is another common cause different from the state of the world. In fact, Ladha
(1992) offers a new version of the CJT which preserves heterogeneous competence
and replaces the state-conditional independence condition by the condition that
choices are correlated in the sense that individuals are influenced by various schools
of thought or opinion leaders.16
Following the lead of Ladha, several authors have recently explored the possibility
of replacing state-conditional independence by alternative independence conditions
which are meant to keep track of a multiplicity of factors that can affect the indi-
viduals’ choices. Let me mention two attempts in this direction which can prove
useful to the present investigation.
Dietrich and List (2004) consider the case in which a jury has a shared body of
evidence and maintain that when this situation holds, we should make room for
an evidence-conditional independence condition to the effect that the shared body
of evidence is the intermediate common cause of individuals’ choices.
Dietrich and Spiekermann (2013a and 2013b) go one step further by claiming that
conditionalisation has to include several common causes which can well go beyond
shared evidence. The idea, in a nutshell, is that in order to account for all common
causes affecting individuals’ choices, we had better adopt a problem-conditional
notion of independence in which we conditionalise on the entire decision problem,
conceived here as “the task of finding a certain correct alternative x (0 or 1) under
certain circumstances c”.17 The notion of a circumstance is meant to include both
evidential and non-evidential (public or private) factors which affect individuals’
choices.
Before going on to establish what notion of independence is best suited for the
CJT-based socio-epistemological argument, it must be noticed that revisions of
the original independence condition give rise to different versions of the CJT. In
general, the original non-asymptotic part of the theorem still holds whereas the
original asymptotic part does not. More specifically: in Ladha’s CJT, except in
rare cases, i.e. when the size of the group is particularly large and opinions are
not too highly correlated, the probability that the majority is right does not con-
verge to 1 as the group size increases. When we conditionalise on the shared
body of evidence the way Dietrich and List (2004) do, we prove a weaker result
than the asymptotic conclusion of the original CJT. That weaker result says that
16See Ladha (1992: 624).
17Dietrich (2008: 58).
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the overall jury reliability at best approaches the probability that the evidence is
truth-conducive. This, in turn, can be interpreted as the probability that, from a
God’s-eye viewpoint, the evidence points to the truth. Its value is typically be-
low 1, reflecting the possibility of misleading evidence. Dietrich and Spiekermann
(2013a) prove the classical non-asymptotic conclusion and a new asymptotic con-
clusion which excludes the idea that large groups are infallible, namely that the
probability of getting it right tends to 1 as the size of the group increases.
The overview of several treatments of the independence condition pursued so far
will enable us to answer the following question: which notion of independence
should we endorse in order to develop a realistic socio-epistemological argument
in favor of the reliability of the Gettier intuition?
It should be kept in mind that we are considering two cases: on the one hand, the
case in which the competence condition is satisfied by a group formed by laymen
and the target of epistemological inquiry is the Western concept of knowledge; on
the other hand, the case in which the competence condition is satisfied by a group
of experts and the target of epistemological inquiry is knowledge itself, and not
anyone’s concept of knowledge. Let us analyse these two cases in turn.
In order to provide a realistic notion of independence in the first case, it seems
plausible to conditionalise on (at least) the following two factors. First: if the
upshot of Gettier cases is taken to be possibly a cultural prejudice, then Western
laymen’s reactions to them are all affected by the fact of being caused by the same
culture, as it were. Second: one may claim that since the individuals involved in
Weinberg, Nichols and Stich’s experiment are all faced with the same Gettier case,
they share the same body of evidence. These considerations suggest that the more
realistic approach to the independence condition in this scenario is the problem-
conditional notion of independence proposed by Dietrich and Spiekermann, for this
notion enables us to take into account various common causes, i.e. being part of
the same culture and being exposed to the same evidence, that affect individuals’
intuitive judgements about Gettier cases.18
The problem-conditional notion of independence affords the means to offer a realis-
tic representation of laymen’s independence during the evaluation of Gettier cases;
for this reason, we should touch on the features of the version of the CJT stated
with such an independence condition which are mostly relevant to the present dis-
cussion. To begin with, Dietrich and Spiekermann’s CJT involves a revision of
the competence condition: competence is conditional on the problem. Secondly,
their problem-conditional competence condition takes into account homogeneous
groups. Thirdly, the original asymptotic conclusion is weakened. Let us take these
18A consequence of problem-conditional independence that is worth flagging is that even ex-
perimental subjects’ intuitions can be said to be contaminated by a common cause, where the
common cause is being part of the same culture.
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three issues in reverse order.
On reflection, the third consequence is not so worrisome for the socio-epistemological
argument. Bear in mind that the argument aims to establish the following the-
sis: the fact that a large group of individuals have the Gettier intuition enhances
the evidential status of the intuition to such an extent that it provides us with
a defeasible justification for the content of the Gettier intuition. To my mind,
infallibility is not required to obtain such a defeasible justification. Therefore, I
take this feature of Dietrich and Spiekermann’s CJT to be perfectly acceptable in
the context of the socio-epistemological argument.
Having clarified this, let us turn to the problem-conditional competence condition.
Dietrich and Spiekermann observe that the new problem-conditional competence
condition is needed since it is possible to show that, when a problem-conditional
notion of independence is coupled with a classical notion of competence, large
groups are worse than small groups or single individuals.19 The notion of problem-
conditional competence rests on the tenet that the probability that an individual
opts for the right choice depends on how difficult the problem is. The probability
exceeds 1
2
when the problem is easy, it is smaller than 1
2
when the problem is dif-
ficult, and it is equal to 1
2
on boundary problems. In a nutshell, the probability
that an individual chooses the right answer depends on the easiness or on the
complexity of the problem at issue. Thus, in order for the probability that each
individual will have the right opinion to exceed 1
2
, we should countenance the idea
that it is easy to establish that the character of Gettier cases does not know the
targeted proposition.
Various factors may have a bearing on whether the task of deciding if gettiered
subjects really know or only believe the targeted propositions is easy or difficult.
To mention but one, the easiness of the problem may vary depending on the Gettier
case one is facing. For instance, one might think that it is fairly easy to establish
that in the Ginet-Goldman’s fake barn scenario the subject does not know that the
object she is looking at is a barn while, at the same time, finding the Chisholm’s
sheep scenario more difficult to assess because the intuition that the subject does
not know that there is a sheep in the field is less solid, or vice versa. However
shaky intuitions may be, though, I will concede that deciding whether a gettiered
subject really knows or only believes the targeted proposition is not a difficult
task; in other words, I grant that individuals’ competence exceeds 1
2
.
In light of these considerations, we can go back over the two aspects of Weinberg,
Nichols and Stich’s experiment I put aside in section 2.1: namely, whether one
of the ethnic groups involved in the Weinberg, Nichols and Stich’s trials is more
competent than the others, and whether one of these groups faces a (more) difficult
decision environment.
19See Dietrich and Spiekermann (2013a: 99-100).
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As far as I can see, when we consider groups formed by non-philosophically-trained
individuals only, it is difficult to ascertain whether one group displays more compe-
tence on the task than another, since it is far from clear whether there are specific
and culturally-determined factors which make the intuitions of a given ethnic group
more competent than those of another. Moreover, much of the existing research
in experimental philosophy has been operating under the tacit assumption that
laymen’s intuitions are all equally legitimate. So, we can safely regard different
ethnic groups as being alike with respect to their average competence.
As for the decision environment, it seems unlikely that, in this particular case, dis-
tinct ethnic groups face radically different decision environments. For one thing,
they deal with the same task, viz. answering the question whether a gettiered sub-
ject really knows or only believes the targeted proposition. It also seems that in-
dividuals are all exposed to the same evidence on the problem: they are presented
with the same Gettier case, and there is no group that displays more familiar-
ity with Gettier cases, for experimental subjects are undergraduates without any
training in philosophy. Furthermore, we can exclude the possibility that one of the
ethnic groups faces a difficult decision environment because of misleading opinion
leadership: as a matter of fact, there are no recognised leaders in these groups,
nor is it plausible to hold that for example the Western group is biased because
influenced by the opinion of a well-known analytic epistemologist who thinks that
gettiered subjects do not have knowledge, since Western participants are laymen
without any familiarity with contemporary epistemology.
Having clarified this, let us turn now to the fact that the problem-specific com-
petence condition is defined for homogeneous groups. Let us state this condition
more precisely. First, notice that for each individual i, Dietrich and Spiekermann
consider an event Ri, which is the event that an individual i chooses correctly. This
is but a notational convenience, for choices and correct choosing events are inter-
definable given x.20 Dietrich and Spiekermann define an individual i’s (problem-
specific) competence as ppii = Pr(Ri | pi), the probability that i chooses correctly
conditional on the problem pi: the value varies depending on how easy the problem
is.
Surely, homogeneity is a limitation of Dietrich and Spiekermann’s CJT: as pointed
out in section 2, the homogeneity condition is highly unrealistic in our case, and it
is often rejected in standard applications of the CJT. Yet, homogeneity should not
be regarded as a necessary condition for this version of CJT, and I believe that
it is possible to widen the span of Dietrich and Spiekermann’s CJT to encompass
heterogeneous groups.
The mathematical development of such a more general version of CJT will have
to be deferred to further works. However, let me briefly outline a general strat-
20See Dietrich and Spiekermann (2013a: 91).
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egy. The key move will be to replace problem-conditional competence by aver-
age problem-conditional competence.21 More precisely, let p¯pi indicate the average
problem-specific competence:






That is, the average problem-specific competence condition is the limit of the
finite-group average problem-specific competence. This formulation of the average
problem-specific competence condition is the natural extension of Dietrich’s 2008
average competence: it is an extension since it conditionalises on the entire de-
cision problem, whereas Dietrich’s 2008 competence condition conditionalises on
the state only.
I submit that it is reasonable to expect that after dropping the homogeneity group
competence condition, the probability that the majority is right in choosing a cer-
tain option given that the chosen option is correct would continue not to converge
to 1 as in the previous asymptotic conclusion of Dietrich and Spiekermann’s CJT
(bear in mind, however, that this weaker conclusion does not undermine the socio-
epistemological argument for the reason offered above). As for the non-asymptotic
conclusion, it would cease to hold if we simply dropped the homogeneity condition,
just as in the classical CJT. Yet, more sophisticated ways of modeling heterogene-
ity might recover the non-asymptotic conclusion, just as described in the case of
the classical CJT in section 2.22
This completes my analysis of the CJT-based socio-epistemological argument for
the reliability of the Gettier intuition in the case where laymen satisfy the compe-
tence condition and the target of epistemological inquiry is the Western concept
of knowledge. Let us turn now to specify the conditions that must be met in or-
der for the CJT-based socio-epistemological argument to hold in the second case,
where the target is the extra-mental phenomenon of knowledge and the group is
composed of professional philosophers only.
The original state-conditional independence condition does not seem to square
with the current philosophical practice. One can point to the fact that being an
21I am grateful to Frantz Dietrich for mentioning this option to me.
22I cannot parse here all possible differences between the CJT with homogeneous problem-
conditional competence and the CJT with heterogeneous problem-conditional competence, so
let me mention just one difference. Dietrich and Spiekermann offer a precise expression of the
















This expression will no longer be defined in the heterogeneous case, for we drop the assumption
that the value of ppi is the same for all individuals. Thanks to Frantz Dietrich for pointing this
out to me.
13
analytic philosopher, one might share possible biases or methods of inquiry proper
of analytic philosophy. In this sense, all analytic philosophers cannot be said to
be independent of each other. Moreover, a philosopher can certainly benefit from
the interaction with other philosophers working on the same topic, since the ex-
change of ideas and feedback have a positive impact on the development of one’s
own ideas. There is much more to be said about philosophical practice, but these
remarks suffice to support the claim that it is unrealistic that professional philoso-
phers satisfy the original state-conditional independence condition: hence, if we
want to avail ourselves of the CJT in the case where the competent group is com-
posed of philosophers, we had better adopt a problem-conditional independence
condition, for such a condition requires us to conditionalise on common causes
which may be arguably taken to affect philosophers’ intuitive judgments, such as
having the same methods, being influenced by the same school of thought (i.e. an-
alytic philosophy), and so on and so forth. This entails that even when we appeal
to the CJT-based socio-epistemological argument in this second case, we should
develop a more general CJT which includes both the realistic problem-conditional
independence condition proposed in Dietrich and Spiekermann (2013a) and the
average problem-conditional competence condition suggested above.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I aimed at shedding new light on Goldman’s suggestion that the
CJT could play a role in the context of a socio-epistemological argument for the
reliability of intuitions, such as the Gettier intuition. I pointed out that Gold-
man’s original proposal is implausible, in that it relies on a version of the CJT
which holds under unrealistic conditions. Nonetheless, this does not make the
socio-epistemological argument ipso facto doomed. I explored other formulations
of the conditions of the CJT by drawing on the ongoing debates on philosophical
methodology. In particular, I proposed to modify the conditions by taking into
account two different views on the target of philosophical areas of inquiry such as
epistemology, and on philosophical expertise. So, where does the foregoing discus-
sion leave us?
I claimed that the most appropriate version of the CJT for the socio-epistemological
argument should have a problem-conditional independence condition and a het-
erogeneous problem-conditional competence condition, and I ventured a tentative
hypothesis on how this CJT can be developed. But it remains an open question
how to fill out the mathematical details of this new CJT. Be that as it may, if my
analysis has provided any insight into the CJT-based socio-epistemological argu-
ment for the reliability of the Gettier intuition and has placed it on the table as
a real option, I will rest content for now and leave the mathematical development
14
of a more general CJT as a topic for future research.
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